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Abstract 
 I analyze the impact of differences in the cigarette excise tax rates of 
bordering states on the price elasticity of demand for cigarettes in the home 
state.  Using unique county-level data on the sales tax revenues collected from 
Kansas tobacco sellers by industry type provided by the Kansas Department of 
Revenue, as well as data on cigarette excise tax rates, distance to Kansas’ 
borders, and the combined state and county sales tax rate, I examine the 
determinants of tobacco sales tax revenue using a fixed effects model.  The 
analysis allows me to infer cigarette demand effects, and I find that the price 
elasticity of demand for cigarettes in Kansas becomes significantly more elastic 
closer to a low tax border.  Model estimates for gas stations with convenience 
stores and tobacco retailers suggest that a Kansas cigarette excise tax decrease 
would result in more sales tax revenue on average for counties within 50 miles of 
a low tax Kansas border, ceteris paribus.
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1. Introduction 
 State cigarette excise taxes have long been marketed in the United States 
as a means to raise state revenues or decrease cigarette consumption 
depending on the favored objective.  Most states have raised their cigarette tax 
rates since 2000 and there is considerable variation across states.  Currently, 
state cigarette excise taxes are as high as $4.35 per pack (New York) and as low 
as $0.17 per pack (Missouri).  The combined local and state excise taxes in fact 
make the tax rate in New York City at $5.85 per pack (Campaign for Tobacco-
Free Kids, 2012).  However, several factors have brought into question the 
effectiveness of such taxation to its desired end.  Low tax borders, in-state low 
tax venues, and the rising prevalence of the internet are all possible avenues for 
tax avoidance.  Of these three, cross-border cigarette purchases are thought by 
some to be the most prevalent form of tax avoidance in the presence of a 
manageably close low tax border.  For example, in 1997, almost all US states 
faced a low excise tax border and, on average, the real difference between the 
states’ rates and their respective low tax neighbor’s rate was 21.9 cents.  By 
2003, this mean difference increased to 39 cents per pack (Chiou and 
Muehlegger, p. 1, 2008), which suggests an increasing tax disparity among 
bordering states.  It is possible this trend has resulted in the adaptation of tax 
avoidance strategies by cigarette consumers. 
 Also in the forefront of this conversation is the increasing level of internet 
penetration, measured as the percentage of households using the internet.  
Computers becoming more affordable over the past two decades has resulted in 
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dramatic increases in national internet penetration since 1990 (Internet World 
Stats, 2012).  We can see from Figure 1, national internet penetration has 
increased from 49.18% at the start of 2001 to 71.96% by the end of 2008.  State 
internet penetration data for Kansas mirrors this trend.1  Paired with these rising 
levels of internet penetration is the opportunity for a newer option in cigarette tax 
avoidance.  As noted in Goolsbee et al. (2010), numerous online venders offer 
tax free cigarettes through their websites.  This allows residents of relatively high 
cigarette taxation states to bypass their local high tax venues in favor of online 
venders.  Although online venders are supposed to tax customers according to 
their state of residency and report this tax to the state, it is believed that only 5% 
do so (Emery et al., p132, 2002).   
 Another option for high cigarette tax avoidance is within the state itself.  
On military bases, cigarette purchases are exempt from state excise taxes and 
therefore offer an alternative to other cigarette merchants in the area.  Indian 
reservations historically have offered lower tax cigarettes relative to the 
surrounding area within a state.  However, recently states have begun to enforce 
the state excise taxes on Indian reservation purchases.  In the case of Kansas, 
Notice 00-07 was passed on July 25, 2000 applying all state cigarette taxes to 
purchases on Indian reservations (KDOR).   This legislation eliminated the tax 
break that previously could be found on Indian reservations in Kansas. 
                                                          
1
 http://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/data/index.html provides a compilation of links to several surveys 
in different years for state-level internet penetration.  These data suggests that Kansas does 
indeed follow the trend of national internet penetration and in fact has slightly higher internet 
penetration than the national average. 
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 Kansas and its bordering states went through a series of cigarette tax 
increases from the years 2002 to 2005.  Cigarette tax rates for Kansas and its 
surrounding states are displayed in Table 1.  Notice that there is significant with-
in and state variation in cigarette tax rates from 2001 to 2005.  During this time 
period, Kansas was the high tax state only in 2003 and 2004.  Except for 
Nebraska, Kansas was the high tax state at 24 cents per pack in 2001.  In 2002, 
Nebraska and Kansas increased tax rates, but Kansas increased by more and 
passed Nebraska as the high tax state at 70 cents per pack.  In 2003, the 
cigarette tax increase in Kansas made it the highest tax state, but, by 2005, the 
Kansas tax rate was surpassed by tax increases in both Colorado and 
Oklahoma.  The trends in the real excise tax rate by state can be seen in Figure 
2.  The figure shows that absent a tax hike, the real excise tax rate is falling over 
time.  Figure 3 shows that the real national wholesale price of cigarettes is falling 
over time.  This is also the case for real retail prices in Kansas, as depicted in 
Figure 3, except in the years of tax hikes.2 
 In the presence of tax avoidance opportunities the probability of desired 
results from cigarette excise tax increases becomes highly questionable.  If such 
opportunities exists then an excise tax increase in a state such as Kansas which 
borders Missouri, a very low excise tax state, has a possibility to obtain neither 
policy goal.  Revenue may be lost to the low tax border state and in the process 
consumption would not be curbed by the excise tax either.  Consumption may in 
fact increase due to consumers stockpiling from low tax venues.  This paper will 
                                                          
2
 Data on the national wholesale and Kansas retail prices of cigarettes are obtained for 2001 to 
2008 from The Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids and The Tobacco Merchants Association, 
respectively. 
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focus on the revenue implications of low tax venues and the extent of border 
crossing behavior. 
 Using tax data from retail establishments for all 105 counties in Kansas 
supplied by the Kansas Department of Revenue (KDOR), I examine the extent to 
which higher cigarette taxes cause smokers to travel to lower tax borders to 
purchase cigarettes.  I do this by examining the extent to which the quantity 
effects of higher cigarette taxes are stronger closer to a low tax border.  One 
complication is that, in Kansas, there are no data on direct quantities sold by 
proximity to a border.  This is because the cigarette tax is levied at the level of 
the wholesaler, and KDOR does not track the wholesalers’ distribution of 
cigarettes after the tax is levied.  However, I can get at the quantity effect using 
the sales tax revenue of tobacco retailers by county.  This is because buyers of 
cigarettes have to pay sales taxes at the time of purchase.  I can thus use the 
data on sales tax revenue collected from tobacco sellers to infer the demand 
effects of a change in cigarette taxes.  If the demand for cigarettes is price 
inelastic, the lack of reduction in quantity demanded of cigarettes combined with 
a higher tax-inclusive retailer price will show up as an increase in sales taxes 
remitted by the sellers of cigarettes. 
 To see why this is so, let t equal the tax rate per pack of cigarettes, ts be 
the sales tax rate, P0 be the pre-tax price of cigarettes and Q1 be the post-tax 
quantity of cigarettes sold.  For simplicity, consider the case of a retailer that only 
sells cigarettes.  Then if demand is perfectly inelastic, the post-tax price of 
cigarettes equals P0 + t.  The sales tax revenue equals: 
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        , 
                       (                )     
  (    )     . 
As can be seen, with inelastic cigarette demand a cigarette tax will increase 
sales tax revenue by   
      . 
 In the case of more elastic demand, notice that the positive revenue 
effects of a higher post-tax cigarette price will be offset from a declining quantity 
sold, thus sales tax revenue collected may not increase and with perfectly elastic 
demand will fall as low tax borders come within a manageable distance.  In sum, 
I am testing the cross-border effects of a changing relative cigarette tax rate in 
Kansas using variation in retail establishments’ sales tax revenue collections by 
border proximity to infer quantity effects.  This is the first paper to infer demand 
and revenue effects using retailer data over time.  Using these data combined 
with distance measures to the low-tax border allows me to uniquely identify the 
responsiveness of demand to changes in the relative tax rate, accounting for 
distance effects. 
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2. Literature Review 
 The effectiveness of cigarette excise taxes has been a topic of research 
for decades.  Whether an increase in such taxation will actually correspond to 
higher state revenues and decreased consumption, as generally predicted, has 
become questioned.  In this section, I review seven key studies examining the 
tax avoidance behavior of smokers.  Five of these studies use national data to 
detect possible effects.  Two use local data for Chicago and California.  All of the 
studies detect some degree of tax avoidance behavior with the strongest source 
coming from the increasing levels of internet penetration. 
Goolsbee et al. (2010) suggest that increasing Internet penetration within 
the United States has led to significantly more responsive tax elasticities for 
cigarette consumers.  The authors examine the responsiveness of cigarette 
demand using U.S. state level data from 1990 to 2005, from the Current 
Population Survey as well as a 2002 consumer survey from Forrester Research 
for their study.  Both of these report Internet usage in the United States.  The 
authors also use data from the Tobacco Institute.  Specifically, they use data on 
cigarette price, sales and excise taxes from this publication.  Their regression 
uses the log of quantity of cigarette packs sold per capita as the dependent 
variable against such independent variables as real per-capita income, the price 
of cigarettes, the real excise tax, and neighboring states’ tax inclusive price as 
well as an interaction of Internet penetration with home state tax.  They conclude 
that the price sensitivity of cigarette consumers has significantly increased due to 
tax-free cigarettes being more widely available through the higher levels of 
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Internet usage.  The authors make a very significant statement on tax rate 
elasticities, reporting that, “The results suggest that sales can be quite elastic 
with respect to state cigarette taxes in the presence of Internet smuggling: the tax 
rate elasticities range from -0.186 to -0.267.  If no Internet smuggling occurred, 
sales are less elastic with respect to tax changes.  The estimate in column (2) is 
indicative at -0.112” (Goolsbee et al, p 146, 2010).  The authors note that the 
price elasticities can be obtained by multiplying the given tax rate elasticities by 
7.43, which equals (p + t)/t.  Doing the simple math this gives an inelastic price 
elasticity of -0.832 without Internet smuggling, but when Internet smuggling is 
present the price elasticity becomes notably elastic ranging from -1.38 to -1.98.  
As a result the effectiveness of higher excise taxes, as both a revenue 
generating policy and consumption deterrent, has been lessened in their opinion. 
Merriman (2010) uses a sample of littered cigarette packs to investigate 
tax avoidance among Chicago residents as a result of its extreme tax disparity 
with neighboring areas.  Merriman reports large differences in tax rates across 
neighboring counties: total taxes vary from $4.05 per pack in Chicago to $1.37 in 
DuPage, Lake, and Will counties in Illinois and a low of 94.5 cents in nearby 
Indiana.  Collectors employed by Merriman were sent along predetermined paths 
within Chicago and surrounding low tax counties in order to collect littered 
cigarette packs.  Origin identifying tax stamps were recorded from collected 
packs and then used to estimate the prevalence of tax avoidance in the 
population.  The study also employs data from the US Census in the regression 
of several linear models of the probability that a littered pack is from a legal local 
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vendor.  Based on the results the author concludes tax avoidance, in regard to 
cigarettes, is pursued by a significant portion of Chicago residents.  Of the packs 
collected strictly in the city of Chicago, 59 percent had identification of being 
purchased in the state of Illinois, 36 percent were purchased in Cook County, 
and only 25 percent had the identification mark for purchase in the city of 
Chicago.  If the sample statistic of only 25 percent being purchased in Chicago, 
where this portion of the discarded packs was collected, is accurate to the 
population, then it is fairly easy to imply the high tax rate is not optimally set.   
More revenue could be raised in Chicago by lowering the tax rate in Chicago. 
The authors also find that tax compliance quickly degenerates as you approach 
low tax borders. 
Lovenheim (2008) uses a cigarette demand model including cross-border 
purchases to determine the significance of cigarette smuggling and its effect on 
state revenue.  The main source of data the authors use is the Current 
Population Survey sections on cigarette consumption.  Lovenheim regresses 
upon cigarette demand the log of the real home state price, difference in the log 
of prices, difference in the log of prices squared, log of distance, log of distance 
multiplied by the difference in the log of prices, and the year.  Table 8, in 
Lovenheim (2008), displays the authors’ estimates for the percent of consumers 
engaging in smuggling activities.  On a national scale between 13 and 25 percent 
of consumers engage in smuggling activities when facing a low cost border or tax 
reduced establishment according to the authors.  More specifically the author 
estimates that approximately 21 percent of Kansas customers participate in such 
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behavior.  Based on this finding he concludes that it would be more efficient for 
states to pursue smuggling prevention policies as a means to raise state revenue 
and reduce consumption rather than continuing to increase tax disparities 
between states. 
Hyland et al. (2005) analyze the impact of changing cigarette prices on the 
purchasing behavior of current smokers.  For their study the authors employ the 
Community Intervention Trial for Smoking Cessation survey, COMMIT, consisting 
of US smoker characteristics in years 1988, 1993, and 2001.  COMMIT was 
collected by the National Cancer Institute in the largest attempt by the institution 
to use methods to help people stop smoking.   COMMIT consists of ten matched 
pairs of communities in the United States and one matched pair in Canada.  
Through the use of descriptive statistics the authors estimate that 59 percent of 
smokers in the 2001 COMMIT survey engaged in some activity to avoid recently 
elevated prices.  A total of 34 percent reported using some form of low tax venue 
such as an Indian reservation or lower tax border.  Furthermore 28 percent and 
18 percent switched to discount brands and coupons respectively.   These 
percentages are not exclusive, meaning that some of the smokers who switched 
to a discount brand may have also started using coupons.  The authors note a 
common distance proposed to be a threshold for significant tax avoidance 
incentive: “The strongest predictors of purchasing less expensive cigarettes were 
living within 40 miles of a place with a lower cigarette excise tax” (Hyland et al, p 
90, 2005).   
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Emery et al. (2002) focuses on the demand for cigarettes by California 
residents in the year following a 1999 $.50 per pack excise tax hike to examine 
the prevalence of tax avoidance in the area.   The authors use the 1999 
California Tobacco Surveys, consisting of 5,215 randomly dialed adult smokers, 
for their study.  They use basic descriptive statistics to determine what percent of 
consumers change consumption behavior as a means of tax avoidance.  Among 
the results: 5.1 percent of California smokers surveyed admitted to evasion of the 
new higher tax by means of some low tax venue amounting to an estimated 
revenue loss of $51 million.  However, most surveyed individuals claimed to have 
continued to purchase at their typical most convenient location.  Among the most 
prevalent purchase locations were convenience stores, drug stores, and 
supermarkets at 45, 16.4 and 8.8 percent respectively.  Although there was an 
admitted tax evasion by 5.1 percent and an estimate revenue loss of $51 million, 
the authors conclude that tax evasion was not a serious issue in California 
overall following the 1999 excise tax increase.  The authors do note however, “It 
is possible that smokers underreported internet cigarette purchases because of 
concerns about the legality of this form of tax avoidance.”  Also, in respect to the 
age of the study, internet penetration did not start significantly increasing until a 
few years after this data was collected.  This could explain the insignificance of 
internet cigarette purchases in this study. 
Stehr (2005) uses a simple regression to estimate tax avoidance in the 
states.  The author’s main data sources are the Tobacco Institute and the 
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, supported by the National Center 
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for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion and the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, from 1984 to 2001.  Stehr concludes that 
border-crossing tax avoidance is not near as detrimental to the cigarette tax 
policy objectives as is the ability to purchase cigarettes from Internet vendors.  It 
is estimated that 12.7 percent of cigarette purchases in the states were done so 
in tax avoidance.  However, less than 1 percent was done so by crossing low tax 
borders.  According to the author the increasing prevalence of tax free Internet 
cigarette vendors accounts for the vast majority of tax avoidance in cigarettes.  
Stehr does give an estimate of the price elasticities for both low and high tax 
states in Table 4 of his study.  He estimates that price elasticity of demand in 
relatively low tax states is -0.600 while relatively high tax states are a more 
elastic -0.907. 
Lesley Chiou and Erich Muehlegger (2008) employ a cross-section in 
2003 of the Current Population Survey Tobacco Use Supplement, TUS, as their 
primary data source to undertake a household level study.  These data allow 
Chiou and Muehlegger to identify the household quantity of cigarettes purchased, 
their purchase location, and their county of residence.  Their final sample has 
roughly 9,700 smokers across the U.S. who report the location of their last 
cigarette purchase.  They note 98% of their sample drove less than 40 miles to 
purchase their most recent pack of cigarettes.  Using this individualized data the 
authors create a model of demand in which they are able to take into account 
consumer preferred purchase location and corresponding cigarette prices and 
excise taxes.  Independent variable for the model include price of cigarettes plus 
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excise tax at chosen location, an interaction between the previously listed 
variable and income, distance to chosen location, an interaction between the 
chosen location and income, distance to chosen location squared, and distance 
dummy variable for between 0 to 10, 10 to 20, 20 to 30, to 30 and 40 miles to 
preferred location.  The distance measures are Euclidean measurements from 
the centroid of the county of residence for the consumer to the nearest county in 
the neighboring state, because the authors do not observe the actual location of 
purchase, only the state of purchase.  Chiou and Muehlegger classify the results 
of their efforts as “between those by Lovenheim (2008) and Stehr (2005)” (p. 3).  
More specifically they find smuggling becomes prevalent as low tax borders 
come into manageable distances, but not quite to the extent put forth in 
Lovenheim (2008). 
Although these studies might not come to a clear joint consensus on the 
primary source of tax avoidance or its prevalence, they do for the most part 
agree that it is present in some magnitude.  All listed studies except for Emery et 
al. (2002) conclude that the tax avoidance identified in their research is 
significant and endangering to the effectiveness of cigarette excise taxes in terms 
of revenue raised and smoking cessation goals.  Of these studies, Chiou and 
Muehlegger (2008) is the most similar to this research, but is limited in that the 
authors do not have longitudinal data and cannot control for unobservable factors 
that may contribute to choices made.  The data I use do not suffer from this 
problem since I observe counties over time, before and after the tax chages. 
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3. Data and Empirical Model 
 I use Kansas county-level quarterly data from 2001 to 2008 to examine tax 
effects.  The data are from a few sources.  KDOR is the primary source I use for 
data.  The sales tax revenue data are quarterly county-level aggregates from the 
years 2001 to 2008 by industry code (NAISC), which identifies retailer type.  The 
three types of retailers I examine are gasoline stations with convenience stores, 
tobacco stores, and vending machines.  Due to an industry code change, data on 
Gasoline Stations with Convenience Stores begins in January 2003 as opposed 
to 2001 like the other two retailer types.  In the data there are 62 counties which 
have gas stations with convenience stores.  Only three counties have tobacco 
sellers.  41 counties have vending machines.3  Also obtained from KDOR are 
2001 to 2008 data on county sales tax rates, Kansas sales tax rates, and Kansas 
cigarette excise tax rates.  I also use 2001 to 2008 data on population and 
income, both measured at the county level in Kansas, from the US Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA, 2012).  Data on the national wholesale and Kansas 
retail prices of cigarettes are obtained for 2001 to 2008 from The Campaign for 
Tobacco-Free Kids (2012) and The Tobacco Merchants Association (2012), 
respectively.  GIS distance measurements are provided by Dr. Tracy Turner.  
County population and income are both annually reported so I use linear 
interpolation to generate quarterly figures for each variable. 
                                                          
3
 KDOR will only provide county aggregates if there are enough establishments of the type to 
ensure retailer anonymity. 
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To examine the implications of higher cigarette taxes for tax avoidance I 
estimate the following econometric model by retailer type using STATA version 
12: 
( )                                          
                  
where     is the total sales tax revenue collected in county j at time t,     is the 
relative cigarette tax rate in county j at time t,           is the distance from the 
center of county j via roadway to the nearest state border, and    
 
 is the combined 
county and state sales tax rate in county j at time t.  The vector X includes 
possible other county variables such as population.     is a county fixed effect to 
control for factors in a county that affect sales revenue, but do not vary over time.  
The county fixed effect controls for any unobserved heterogeneity that may affect 
the dependent variable (Baltagi BH, 1995).      is the error term. 
 The relative cigarette tax rate     faced in a given county j is computed as 
the difference between the real Kansas excise tax and the real excise tax rate at 
the nearest Kansas border to that county at time t.  Note that the combined 
effects of changes in Kansas and neighboring states’ tax rates generate sizable 
variation in the Kansas relative tax rate within counties over time.  This can be 
seen in Figure 4, where I graph the relative tax rate in each Kansas border-
sample county over time.  In essence, my econometric approach identifies cross-
border tax effects using the variation in the neighboring states' excise tax rates 
relative to Kansas over time. 
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 The main hypothesis being tested is the revenue boosting potential of 
cigarette taxes will fall short of expectations in the presence of low tax borders.  
Referring to equation (1), I expect β1 to be negative and the coefficient on the 
interaction term, β2, to be positive.  This prediction is due to relative price 
elasticities with respect to substitutes.  In my study the availability of substitutes 
is inversely related to the distance to a relatively low tax border.  As you move 
closer to a low tax border the high tax state’s price elasticity for cigarettes 
becomes increasingly elastic since substitutes become increasingly available due 
to reduced travel distance.  I expect neighboring states’ cigarettes to be a very 
strong substitute for Kansas cigarettes for households on the border resulting in 
overall elastic demand at the border.  As you move away from the low tax border, 
the price elasticity will become more inelastic since the substitute sellers become 
unreasonably far away to be considered.   
 Note that, in equation (1) the marginal effect of a $1.00 increase in the 
Kansas cigarette tax rate equals: 
( )     
    
    
                  
We see that if          = 0 , ie., the cigarette retailer is on the county border with 
a low tax neighbor, the sales tax revenue will fall according to β1.  To the extent 
that the retailer is farther away, distance will mitigate this effect, eventually 
moving toward a positive net effect of an increase in cigarette tax on sales tax 
revenue.  Prior research suggests that somewhere around 40 miles to the 
16 
 
nearest low tax border, the marginal effect of a $1.00 increase in the cigarette tax 
rate switches from negative to positive (Hyland et al.). 
 Referring to equation (1), I expect that more populated counties will on 
average have higher sales tax revenue.  Other factors that might matter at the 
county level that are time invariant will be captured by the county fixed effect.   
Regarding   , it is unclear what sign it will take on.  Because the sales tax rate is 
low at an average of 6.1% compared to the cigarette tax rate (for small 
purchases), on a non-durable purchase it may be that consumer behavior is not 
altered much by small changes in    
 .  In this case, I expect    to be positive. 
 I estimate equation (1) by industry type: Gas stations with convenience 
stores, tobacco stores, and vending machines.  I also consider three 
specifications for each industry type: Real sales tax revenue in thousands, log of 
real sales tax revenue, and per capita real sales tax revenue, to pick up 
population effects.  These specifications give a linear model, a nonlinear model, 
and a model that corrects for what is an immense population disparity between 
counties. 
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4. Empirical Results 
I estimate equation (1) separately for each of the three retailer types for 
the reporting counties within 50 miles of any border and for the reporting counties 
within 50 miles of the Missouri border.4  I concentrate on the counties nearest to 
the borders since prior findings suggest little effect more than 40 miles from the 
border.  Summary statistics are reported by industry and sample type in Tables 
2, 3 and 4.  The two sample subsets include counties within 50 miles of any 
border, and counties within 50 miles of the Missouri border.  All dollar values are 
in 2012 dollars.  Evident from these tables are the striking difference across 
Kansas counties in several variables.  Referring to the convenience stores 
sample for all borders, in terms of population, Elk County has the least population 
of 2,939, while Johnson County has the highest population of 532,175, over 180 
times the population of Elk County.  County income levels also show remarkable 
variation.  For example, Elk County has the lowest reported real county income 
of $87.6 million, while Johnson County has a staggering county income of $33.2 
billion.  This is mainly due to the large population Johnson County possesses. In 
per capita terms Johnson County is slightly more than twice as large as Elk 
County.  The large differences in population and income across counties suggest 
it is important to control for county fixed effects. 
Also notice from Table 2 that the difference in real excise tax rates 
between Kansas and its closest bordering states differs greatly between 
                                                          
4
 Except in the case of tobacco stores.  There are only three counties in Kansas with Tobacco 
retailers.  Two of these are within 50 miles of a border (in this case Missouri).  The third is in 
Sedgwick County and is more than 50 miles away from the Oklahoma border. I include all three 
counties in the tobacco stores sample. 
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counties.  Referring to the max and min values reported in Table 2 for the any-
border sample the difference in real excise tax rates (Kansas excise tax minus 
nearest border excise tax) reaches a minimum value of -$0.29 between Kansas 
and Oklahoma, meaning Kansas was the low tax state in relation to Oklahoma by 
29 cents, and a maximum value of $0.78 between Kansas and Missouri, 
meaning Kansas was the high tax state in relation to Missouri by 78 cents.  
Distance to the nearest border also varies significantly between Kansas counties.  
The longest distance to the nearest border observed from the data is 48.56 
miles, while the shortest distance is only 11.62 miles.  The combined state and 
county tax rate in Kansas has a minimum and maximum of 5.3% and 7.55%, 
respectively, in the sample. 
 Table 5 reports the empirical results for convenience stores with a gas 
station run on the two subsamples of Kansas counties.  The results generally 
reflect expectations.  Where statistically significant, we see the β1 is negative and 
β2 is positive.  The data do not suggest a linear effect as in models (1) and (4) of 
Table 5.  Referring to models (2) and (5), note that the marginal effects in these 
models are computed as follows: 
    
  
                   
 
 
 
  
  
                   
( )      
  
  
    (              )   
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I use the sample means of Y, $141.74, and distance, 23.78, to compute the 
marginal effect of a $1.00 increase in the Kansas cigarette excise tax rate on 
sales tax revenue.  Note that the average distance is the average distance to the 
border for counties within 50 miles to the border.  This marginal effect for model 
(2) in Table 5 equals: 
  
  
 (      )  (                   )   
  
  
           
This marginal effect implies that on average we expect a $1.00 increase in the 
Kansas cigarette excise tax will result in a $3,511 decrease in sales tax revenue 
collected from gas stations with a convenience store, ceteris paribus.  Table 6 
shows the average marginal effect for gas stations with convenience stores for 
models (2), (3), (5), and (6) as well as the marginal effects at specific distances 
for each model.  Referring first to the log models, notice that the average revenue 
impacts are much larger for counties near the Missouri border.  For model (5) the 
average marginal effect is -4.593.  This means that on average we expect a 
$1.00 increase in the Kansas cigarette tax will result in a $4,593 decrease in 
convenience store quarterly sales tax revenue, ceteris paribus, which is almost 
twice the revenue loss from the larger sample.  As a percent of the sample 
average revenue collected, for any border, model (2) indicates a quarterly 
revenue loss from a $1.00 increase in the cigarette tax of 
     
      
, which equals 
2.5% of revenue.  For the Missouri border, the corresponding revenue loss is 
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, which equals 2.15% of revenue.  As can be seen from Table 6, both 
models (2) and (5) predict strong adverse revenue effects near the border with 
revenue losses at $14,811 or 10% (computed as 
      
      
), of revenue and $47,469 
or 22% (computed as 
      
      
), of revenue on the border, respectively, and adverse 
effects persisting but weakening up to between 20 and 30 miles away from the 
border, consistent with expectations. 
 Referring to the per capita models marginal effects reported in Table 6, 
the marginal effects are strongest closest to the border, with a $1.00 increase in 
cigarette tax translating into a decrease in sales tax revenue of 82 cents per pack 
and 49.6 cents per pack for models (6) and (3), respectively.  Interestingly, like 
the log models the negative effect is stronger in the Missouri sample up to 10 
miles out, but, unlike the log models, the per capita marginal effects at the mean 
are not more negative in the Missouri sample.  Translating the per capita models, 
we see that the average county population in the all border sample is 
approximately 38,420 and in the Missouri sample, the average county population 
is about 59,912.  These population data translate the impacts in models (3) and 
(5), on the border, to $19,056, computed as (     )(      ), and $49,128, 
computed as (     )(      ), respectively, in lost revenue.   
 For counties within 50 miles of any border, for models (2) and (3), and 
counties within 50 miles of the Missouri border, for model (5), we see that the 
price elasticity of demand for cigarettes is in fact elastic on average, because the 
marginal effect is negative on average, resulting in a drop in sales revenue for 
convenience store retailers and sales tax revenue for the state government.  
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Model (6) shows an average marginal effect of 0.0324 for counties within 50 
miles of the Missouri border.  This suggests that on average we expect a $1.00 
increase in the Kansas cigarette excise tax will result in a 3 cent per person 
increase in gas station with convenience store sales tax revenue.  This model 
result implies that while the price elasticity is still inelastic on average, it is much 
more elastic than would be expected for cigarettes.  Notice also the interval the 
marginal effect switches from negative to positive.  For model (2) we observe this 
change in the marginal effect between 30 and 40 miles from any low tax Kansas 
border.  Model (3) suggests a large distance of between 50 and 60 miles from 
any border.  Models (5) and (6) portray the same range of between 20 and 30 
miles.  Again, these results overall are consistent with what I was expecting to 
see. 
 Table 7 reports the empirical results for tobacco store retailers.  The 
results exactly reflect economic theory.  All three models estimated are 
statistically significant with the expected signs, β1 is negative and β2 is positive.  
Table 8 shows the results of using the marginal effect equations previous listed.   
The average marginal effects of all three tobacco retailer models are negative.  
For model (1) we get an average marginal effect of -15.127 meaning that on 
average we expect a $1.00 increase in Kansas cigarette excise tax rates to result 
in a sizable $15,127 decrease in tobacco store sales tax revenue, ceteris 
paribus, constituting a roughly 21% (calculated as 
      
     
) decrease in sales tax 
revenue.  The average marginal effect for model (2) is -11.117.  This implies that, 
on average, a $1.00 increase in the Kansas cigarette excise tax rates result in a 
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$11,117 decrease in tobacco store sales tax revenue.  Finally, model (3) shows 
an average marginal effect of -0.0401.  This means that we expect to see, on 
average, a $1.00 increase in the Kansas cigarette excise tax rate result in a 
decrease in tobacco store sales tax revenue of approximately 4 cents per 
person.  The county population average for these three counties equals 348,528 
which suggest a drop in total revenue of $13,948.  Also shown in Table 8 are the 
marginal effects at specific distances for all three models.  Notice that the 
adverse revenue effects are very large on the border in each of the three models 
at 88%, 66% and 72%, respectively, for models (1), (2) and (3) in Table 8.5  Also 
interesting to note here is that all three models show the same interval at which 
the marginal effect switches from positive to negative.  This switch happens 
between 40 and 50 miles, also consistent with what I was expecting to observe.  
 Table 9 reports the results for vending machines.  The results are not 
consistent across samples.  The results suggest for counties within 50 miles of 
any border demand is always inelastic even on the border.  This is shown by, 
where significant, both β1 and β2 being positive.  This means that even on the 
border, we see an increase in vending machine revenue of β1.  However, for 
counties within 50 miles of the Missouri border we get a result similar to what we 
observe for gas stations with convenience stores and tobacco stores.  Where 
statistically significant, β1 is negative and β2 is positive.  The Missouri sample 
implies, like the previous two retailers, that demand is elastic at the border and 
                                                          
5
 Note that I calculate 88% as follows:  It equals the revenue loss at a distance of 1 mile from the border, 
$65.134, reported in model (1) if Table 6, divided by the sample average sales tax revenue for tobacco 
stores of $73.450.  The 66% equals 
      
     
.  The 72% is calculated using the revenue loss per capita at a 
distance of 1 mile from the border, -0.1567, divided by the sample average per capita sales tax revenue 
for tobacco stores of 0.2179. 
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becomes inelastic as you move away from the low tax border.  It is unclear why 
this pattern is emerging in the results. 
 It is interesting to note that across models, the sales tax coefficient is 
negative (where significant) in the convenience store estimates.  This is a 
surprising result, suggesting that the demand for convenience store goods is 
elastic with respect to the sales tax, and may be occurring because of cross-
border effects are present here too.  Another possibility is that since the sales tax 
revenue data for convenience stores includes all goods sold, the negative 
coefficient may be displaying consumer’s desire to substitute away from higher 
priced convenience store goods in favor of lower priced grocery store goods in 
the case of increasing sales tax rates.  
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5. Conclusion 
 In this paper I analyze the effects of the prominent cigarettes excise tax 
disparity between relatively high and low tax bordering states on the sales tax 
revenue of retailers in Kansas.   I estimated a county fixed effects econometric 
model.  As expected, I find that distance to a low tax bordering state has a 
significant impact on the price elasticity of demand for cigarettes.  For 
convenience stores and tobacco stores the results for the border are strong and 
consistent across models.  Interestingly, the strongest effect is on the revenues 
for tobacco retailers.  This is likely because these retailers solely collect their 
sales tax revenue from cigarette purchases, while convenience stores sell a 
variety of goods.  Also interesting, I do not detect a consistent effect for vending 
machines.  The demand is always inelastic for the all borders sample.  This result 
would be intuitive if vending machine purchases are an impulse, must-have, buy.  
But then on the Missouri border, results indicate elastic demand at the mean. 
 With the results noted above it’s important to recognize that cigarette 
excise taxes are most likely not fulfilling their intended purpose, that being state 
revenue generation and curbing cigarette consumption.  In fact, a cigarette 
excise tax increase could not only result in lost revenue near the border of a 
lower taxed state, but may also increase consumption for those who pursue tax 
avoidance.  The reasoning behind this assertion is that the tax disparities shown 
in my paper may influence stockpiling behavior in consumers who participate in 
tax avoidance.  The incentive for stockpiling is to reduce the number of trips 
across state borders, thus overall increasing the effectiveness of the consumer’s 
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tax avoidance.  However, with the presence of large amounts of product, the 
consumer may be persuaded to increase consumption. 
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TABLES 
TABLE 1 
Area Excise Tax History 2001 to 2008 
                  
    
State Excise Tax Rates on Cigarettes 
Year 
   
Kansas Missouri Colorado Nebraska Oklahoma 
2001 
   
$0.24 $0.17 $0.20 $0.34 $0.23 
2002 
   
$0.70 $0.17 $0.20 $0.64 $0.23 
2003 
   
$0.79 $0.17 $0.20 $0.64 $0.23 
2004 
   
$0.79 $0.17 $0.20 $0.64 $0.23 
2005 
   
$0.79 $0.17 $0.84 $0.64 $1.03 
2006 
   
$0.79 $0.17 $0.84 $0.64 $1.03 
2007 
   
$0.79 $0.17 $0.84 $0.64 $1.03 
2008 
   
$0.79 $0.17 $0.84 $0.64 $1.03 
2009 
   
$0.79 $0.17 $0.84 $0.64 $1.03 
2010 
   
$0.79 $0.17 $0.84 $0.64 $1.03 
2011 
   
$0.79 $0.17 $0.84 $0.64 $1.03 
2012 
   
$0.79 $0.17 $0.84 $0.64 $1.03 
Data Source: KDOR 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics: Convenience Stores Quarterly Panel Data on Kansas Counties 
                    
Counties Within 50 Miles of Any Border 2003 to 2008 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N n 
Real Sales Tax Revenue Convenience 
Stores (Thousands) 
141.749 287.852 11.0837 1863.61 792 33 
Real Sales Tax Revenue Convenience 
Stores (Per Capita) 
4.83749 1.938028 1.21331 16.2172 792 33 
Combined State and County Sales Tax 
Rate in Kansas 
0.06103 0.005034 0.053 0.0755 792 33 
Difference in Excise Tax of Kansas and 
Missouri 
0.71907 0.039101 0.64974 0.77854 792 33 
Difference in Excise Tax of Kansas and 
Colorado 
0.20505 0.369693 -0.05986 0.74087 792 33 
Difference in Excise Tax of Kansas and 
Nebraska 
0.17397 0.00946 0.1572 0.18836 792 33 
Difference in Excise Tax of Kansas and 
Oklahoma 
0.05045 0.452967 -0.28734 0.7032 792 33 
Income (Thousands) 1630974 4963952 87625.3 3.32E+07 792 33 
Income (Per Capita) 34642.8 19132.63 18480.8 62422 792 33 
Distance to Closest Border 23.78 12.03942 11.625 48.5577 792 33 
County Population 38419.8 88343.88 2939 532175 792 33 
Counties Within 50 Miles of Missouri Border 2003 to 2005 
Real Sales Tax Revenue Convenience 
Stores (Thousands) 
213.638 367.4452 20.4588 1776.63 216 18 
Real Sales Tax Revenue Convenience 
Stores (Per Capita) 
4.26216 1.442679 1.21331 7.65183 216 18 
Combined State and County Sales Tax 
Rate in Kansas 
0.0635 0.003113 0.053 0.068 216 18 
Difference in Excise Tax of Kansas and 
Missouri 
0.75285 0.019478 0.72005 0.77854 216 18 
Income (Thousands) 2543610 6189170 207675 2.81E+07 216 18 
Income (Per Capita) 32142.2 6381.942 18480.8 56593.1 216 18 
Distance to Closest Border 25.1816 14.41603 11.625 49.4108 216 18 
County Population 59911.7 111536.6 7868 504441 216 18 
Data Sources: KDOR and BEA 
Notes: Convenience Store data starts in 2003 due to Industry code change.  N is the number of observations and n is 
the number of counties. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics: Tobacco Stores Quarterly Panel Data on Kansas Counties 
                
Counties Within 50 Miles of Any Border 2001 to 2005 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N n 
Real Sales Tax Revenue Tobacco Stores 
(Thousands) 
73.4525 39.17867 13.18 139.021 60 3 
Real Sales Tax Revenue Tobacco Stores 
(Per Capita) 
0.21792 0.050567 0.12522 0.36372 60 3 
Combined State and County Sales Tax 
Rate in Kansas 
0.06224 0.002894 0.0575 0.073 60 3 
Difference in Excise Tax of Kansas and 
Missouri 
0.54621 0.302116 0.08945 0.77854 60 3 
Difference in Excise Tax of Kansas and 
Colorado 
0.35826 0.356854 -0.05986 0.74087 60 3 
Difference in Excise Tax of Kansas and 
Nebraska 
0.09719 0.163457 -0.13079 0.45806 60 3 
Difference in Excise Tax of Kansas and 
Oklahoma 
0.28329 0.406075 -0.28734 0.7032 60 3 
Income (Thousands) 1.64E+07 9880498 3384443 2.81E+07 60 3 
Income (Per Capita) 43428.8 9731.691 33589.8 58238.2 60 3 
Distance to Closest Border 38.4338 19.82863 11.625 58.2333 60 3 
County Population 348528 175374 100503 504441 60 3 
Data Sources: KDOR and BEA 
Notes: N is the number of observations and n is the number of counties.  Tobacco stores sample includes 
Sedgwick County since there is a total of only three counties in Kansas with tobacco store revenue reported. 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics: Vending Machines Quarterly Panel Data on Kansas Counties 
                  
Counties Within 50 Miles of Any Border 2001 to 2008 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N n 
Real Sales Tax Revenue Vending Machines 
(Thousands) 
13.4829 26.2619 0.05389 148.67 608 19 
Real Sales Tax Revenue Vending Machines 
(Per Capita) 
0.21233 0.1654 0.00634 0.7967 608 19 
Combined State and County Sales Tax Rate 
in Kansas 
0.0616 0.00471 0.049 0.068 608 19 
Difference in Excise Tax of Kansas and 
Missouri 
0.59836 0.24673 0.08945 0.77854 608 19 
Difference in Excise Tax of Kansas and 
Colorado 
0.20319 0.34429 -0.0599 0.74087 608 19 
Difference in Excise Tax of Kansas and 
Nebraska 
0.12292 0.13252 -0.1308 0.45806 608 19 
Difference in Excise Tax of Kansas and 
Oklahoma 
0.07758 0.41494 -0.2873 0.7032 608 19 
Income (Thousands) 2566316 6235982 226051 3.32E+07 608 19 
Income (Per Capita) 33687.6 6361.18 18480.8 62421.9 608 19 
Distance to Closest Border 26.9774 13.774 11.625 49.0946 608 19 
County Population 59431.7 109342 7681 532175 608 19 
Counties Within 50 Miles of Missouri Border 2001 to 2005 
Real Sales Tax Revenue Vending Machines 
(Thousands) 
17.8995 31.7764 0.19162 148.67 260 13 
Real Sales Tax Revenue Vending Machines 
(Per Capita) 
0.20573 0.15655 0.01244 0.75511 260 13 
Combined State and County Sales Tax Rate 
in Kansas 
0.06288 0.00299 0.049 0.068 260 13 
Difference in Excise Tax of Kansas and 
Missouri 
0.54621 0.30017 0.08945 0.77854 260 13 
Income (Thousands) 3340804 7021262 253797 2.81E+07 260 13 
Income (Per Capita) 33174.3 7312.8 18480.8 58238.2 260 13 
Distance to Closest Border 24.08 13.8721 11.625 49.0946 260 13 
County Population 77098.7 124037 10087 504441 260 13 
Data Sources: KDOR and BEA 
Notes: N is the number of observations and n is the number of counties. 
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Table 5 
Convenience Stores: Determinants of County Sales Tax Revenue 
         
   Counties within 50 miles of any border Counties within 50 miles of Missouri 
   2001 to 2008 2001 to 2005 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   Revenue in Log of Per Capita Revenue in Log of Per Capita 
   Thousands Revenue Revenue Thousands Revenue Revenue 
Difference in excise tax with 
closest border 
 
2.083 
(8.206) 
-0.108** 
(0.047) 
-0.5048** 
(0.2462) 
-26.87 
(33.95) 
-0.2305** 
(0.1144) 
-0.859* 
(0.473) 
         
Difference in excise tax with 
closest border X Distance to 
border 
 
0.0299 
(0.363) 
0.0035* 
(0.0018) 
0.0091 
(0.0094) 
1.014 
(1.154) 
0.0083** 
(0.0039) 
0.0354** 
(0.0161) 
         
Combined state and county 
sales tax rate in Kansas 
 
-1101.73 
(699.35) 
-15.08*** 
(4.046) 
-41.64** 
(20.98) 
-1370.9 
(3938.5) 
-43.05*** 
(13.27) 
-83.34 
(54.9) 
Observations   792 792 792 216 216 216 
Number of Counties  33 33 33 18 18 18 
 
Notes: All models include county fixed effects.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6 
Convenience Stores: Marginal Effects 
         
  
Model Number 
Distance 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
1 
 
-14.81183 
 
-0.4957 
 
-47.468586 
 
-0.8236 
10 
 
-10.34702 
 
-0.4138 
 
-31.510425 
 
-0.505 
20 
 
-5.38612 
 
-0.3228 
 
-13.779135 
 
-0.151 
30 
 
-0.42522 
 
-0.2318 
 
3.952155 
 
0.203 
40 
 
4.53568 
 
-0.1408 
 
21.683445 
 
0.557 
50 
 
9.49658 
 
-0.0498 
 
39.414735 
 
0.911 
60 
 
14.45748 
 
0.0412 
 
57.146025 
 
1.265 
70 
 
19.41838 
 
0.1322 
 
74.877315 
 
1.619 
80 
 
24.37928 
 
0.2232 
 
92.608605 
 
1.973 
90 
 
29.34018 
 
0.3142 
 
110.3399 
 
2.327 
100 
 
34.30108 
 
0.4052 
 
128.07119 
 
2.681 
Average 
 
-3.511 
 
-0.2884 
 
-4.593 
 
0.0324 
Notes: Averages are calculated using the average distance to the border of counties within 50 miles of the border.  Models (2) 
and (3) use average values from the any border subset while models (5) and (6) use average values from the Missouri border 
subset 
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Table 7 
 
Tobacco Stores: Determinants of County Sales Tax Revenue 
 
              
    
All Tobacco Retailers 
    
2001 to 2005 
     
(1) (2) (3) 
     
Revenue in Log of Per Capita 
     
Thousands Revenue Revenue 
 
Difference in excise tax with 
closest border 
 
-66.47*** 
(16.87) 
-0.674*** 
(0.229) 
-0.1599*** 
(0.0499) 
        
 
Difference in excise tax with 
closest border X Distance to 
border 
 
1.336*** 
(0.341) 
0.0136*** 
(0.0046) 
0.0032*** 
(0.001) 
        
 
Combined state and county 
sales tax rate in Kansas 
 
-250 
(833.3) 
-1.03 
(11.29) 
-0.683 
(2.468) 
 
Observations 
 
60 60 60 
 
Number of Counties 
 
3 3 3 
 
Notes: There are only three counties in Kansas with Tobacco retailers.  Two of these are within 50 miles of a border 
(in this case Missouri).  The third is in Sedgwick County and is more than 50 miles away from the Oklahoma border. I 
include all three counties.  All models include county fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8 
Tobacco Stores: Marginal Effects 
         
  
Model Number 
Distance 
  
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
1 
  
-65.134 
 
-48.50638 
 
-0.1567 
 
10 
  
-53.11 
 
-39.5161 
 
-0.1279 
 
20 
  
-39.75 
 
-29.5269 
 
-0.0959 
 
30 
  
-26.39 
 
-19.5377 
 
-0.0639 
 
40 
  
-13.03 
 
-9.5485 
 
-0.0319 
 
50 
  
0.33 
 
0.4407 
 
0.0001 
 
60 
  
13.69 
 
10.4299 
 
0.0321 
 
70 
  
27.05 
 
20.4191 
 
0.0641 
 
80 
  
40.41 
 
30.4083 
 
0.0961 
 
90 
  
53.77 
 
40.3975 
 
0.1281 
 
100 
  
67.13 
 
50.3867 
 
0.1601 
 
Average 
  
-15.128 
 
-11.117 
 
-0.0401 
 
Notes: Averages are calculated using the average distance to the border of counties within 50 miles of the border. 
All three models use average values from the Missouri border subset 
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Table 9 
 Vending Machines: Determinants of County Sales Tax Revenue 
         
   Counties within 50 miles of any border Counties within 50 miles of Missouri 
   2001 to 2008 2001 to 2005 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   Revenue in Log of Per Capita Revenue in Log of Per Capita 
   Thousands Revenue Revenue Thousands Revenue Revenue 
Difference in excise tax with 
closest border 
 
6.243*** 
(1.697) 
0.2001* 
(0.108) 
0.008 
(0.015) 
-8.62** 
(4.03) 
-0.309* 
(0.184) 
-0.0363 
(0.0243) 
         
Difference in excise tax with 
closest border X Distance to 
border 
 
0.1457** 
(0.065) 
-0.0049 
(0.0041) 
-0.0004 
(0.0006) 
0.1978* 
(0.103) 
0.0089* 
(0.0047) 
0.0007 
(0.0007) 
         
Combined state and county 
sales tax rate in Kansas 
 
-393.14*** 
(87.16) 
1.591 
(5.55) 
-2.733*** 
(0.7854) 
-447.98 
(354.58) 
19.804 
(16.19) 
-0.6602 
(2.144) 
Observations   608 608 608 260 260 260 
Number of Counties  19 19 19 13 13 13 
Notes: All models include county fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 3 
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Figure 4 
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